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FINAL STATUS FOR KOSOVO
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Transforming nondemocratic states is one of the great challenges of
the twenty-first century. Since the official end of the U.N. trusteeship sys-
tem and the subsequent end of the Cold War, the international community
has intervened in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq to set
up "political trusteeships," 1 under which the international community exer-
cises powers traditionally associated with sovereignty.2 The legal structure
of these political trusteeships has varied widely. Only in East Timor has the
political trustee made a relatively clean exit.
* Professor of Law and former Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Member, Council on
Foreign Relations, and Member of the Board of Directors of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
Member of the bar: Virginia, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, Maryland, and United States Supreme
Court. Democratic Candidate for U.S. Congress, 10th District of Illinois, 2002. (312) 906-5098, hper-
ritt@kcntlaw.edu. The author appreciates the many conversations he has had with symposium partici-
pants and other political and opinion leaders in Kosovo, including Ramush Haradinaj, Hasim Thaci,
Bajram Rexhepi, and also thoughtful observations from Robert Sorenson, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Kirk McBride, Political Officer, and Michael McClellan, long-term Public Affairs Officer, at the U.S.
Office-Pristina, and Dale Pfeiffer, Head of Mission, USAID-Pristina. Of course, they do not necessar-
ily embrace the views expressed herein.
Andrew Wachtel, Dean of the Graduate School at Northwestern University, collaborated in
organizing and moderating the symposium and co-authored the initial report, from which much of this
introduction is drawn. The author appreciates the opportunity over many years to work with Prof.
Wachtel on developing a greater understanding of challenges in the Balkans.
One of the most important contributors to the work of the Symposium and preparation of this
volume has not been adequately recognized elsewhere. Michelle Brunsvold, the Editor-in-Chief of the
Chicago-Kent Law Review, has been tireless and committed in her work on all of the articles published
here. She has personally edited all of them and worked intelligently to make sure that differences
between the Albanian and English languages did not get in the way of clear expression and rigorous
analysis. To her belongs much of the credit for any contributions made here.
I. In Kosovo, the United Nations is the political trustee. There, the U.N. Interim Administrative
Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") exercises all aspects of sovereignty, devolving power to elected local
institutions function-by-function, while reserving a veto power-
2. Recently, I published a law review article, which sought to draw lessons from recent interna-
tional interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It offers a number of "pre-
scriptions" for successful political trusteeships. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for
Political Trusteeship, 8 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 385 (2003) [hereinafter Political Trustee-
ship]. The article explains why the concept I labeled "political trusteeship" provides a more accurate
legal framework than "protectorate," "belligerent occupant," or "peacekeeping" for evaluating interna-
tional civil administration.
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Kosovo, so far, is the high-water mark of international authority.
When the United Nations Security Council authorized U.N. civil admini-
stration of Kosovo in 1999, after Serbia agreed to withdraw its forces to
end a NATO bombing campaign, it provided that its political trustee would
exercise all the attributes of sovereignty over the territory, but only for an
interim period. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo ("UNMIK") was instructed to "promot[e]... self-government in
Kosovo, ' ' 3 to "transfer[r], as these institutions are established, its adminis-
trative responsibilities [to] local provisional institutions;"'4 to "facilitate[e] a
political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status;" 5 and, "in a
final stage," to "overse[e] the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provi-
sional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement."'6
UNMIK was slow to organize its civil administration, 7 has been un-
even in the quality of its governance (while showing some success in infra-
structure reconstruction and in overseeing four rounds of peaceful and fair
local elections), and has done almost nothing to facilitate determination of
final status and eventual handover of its power.
On April 16-17, 2004, the Chicago-Kent Law Review, the Northwest-
em University Center for International and Comparative Studies, the Uni-
versity of Pristina Law Faculty, the McCormick Tribune Foundation, and
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations cosponsored a Symposium: Fi-
nal Status for Kosovo: Untying the Gordian Knot.8 Participants in the sym-
posium discussed a range of legal, political, and economic issues that frame
the context for negotiations over Kosovo's final status, envisioned by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1244. This issue of the law review contains a
collection of law review articles and essays developed from formal papers
presented at the symposium. The articles focus primarily on legal issues-
as befits a law review. It is important to understand, however, that determi-
nation of final status for Kosovo is not primarily a legal question; it is a
political question. This introduction sketches some of the nonlegal factors
within which legal discourse occurs. It also offers basic historical back-
3. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR,54th Sess.,4011thmtg. 11 (a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
4. Id. I l(d).
5- d I1(e)_
6. Id. I (f).
7. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ICG BALKANS REPORT No, 83, STARTING FROM SCRATCH IN Kosovo:
THE HONEYMOON IS OVER (Dec. 10, 1999), at http://www.icg.orglhome/index.cfm?id=1580&l=1 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004),
8. The Symposium grew out of discussions among the author, Professor Rexhep Murati of the
University of Pristina Law Faculty, and Dastid Pallaska, graduate of the University of Pristina Law
School, in the outskirts of Pristina in July 2003, following a successful symposium on the same subject
sponsored by the University.
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ground on the crisis in Kosovo, leading to international intervention in
1999 and the subsequent U.N. civil administration of Kosovo.
While legal issues and arguments will not be determinative by them-
selves, they are nevertheless important. The ultimate political positions
taken by the governments of the states making up the international commu-
nity will be determined by what the leaders of those governments believe is
"right," and by their assessments of the interrelationships between the posi-
tions they take on Kosovo and domestic pubic reaction to those positions in
their own countries. Persuading them and their publics at home that some
alternatives are legal and others are not shapes their perceptions both of
what is "right," and how their publics are likely to react at home. In other
words, legal argumentation is a persuasive form of political rhetoric. Few
political leaders want to be put in the position of declaring that they do not
care about the law and that they and their countries are comfortable pro-
claiming themselves to be outlaws.
Accordingly, the material in this issue seeking to reconcile the interna-
tional legal system's concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and hu-
man rights represent material contributions to the broader political debate
over the future of Kosovo. Because human rights violations played such an
important part in the justification for international intervention in Kosovo,
the discussions in this issue about how to protect human rights in various
future configurations for Kosovo, especially those of minority ethnic
groups, are particularly significant.
In addition, the several discussions of the role of internal boundaries
defining Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia and within the Republic of
Serbia are important because of the principle adopted by the international
community that the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the consequent definition
of new states there should be handled without disturbing Yugoslavia's in-
ternal borders.
A report and recommendations were released shortly after the sympo-
sium.9 This introduction draws extensively on the content and language of
that report. The full text of the report is available at
http://operationkosovo.kentlaw.edu.
1. BACKGROUND
The history of Kosovo reflects centuries of conflicting ethnic myths
and nationalist aspirations. The historic conflict infects political analysis,
9. The report was authored by the co-organizers of the Symposium: this author and Andrew
Baruch Wachtel, Dean of the Graduate School, Northwestern University.
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poisoning efforts to focus on a twenty-first century solution instead of at-
tempting to redress insults from centuries before. The energies of the Serb
and Kosovar Albanian stakeholders must be focused on the future rather
than on developing and presenting competing interpretations of history.
Nevertheless, an historical sketch is necessary to understand the po-
litical and legal context of the current political trusteeship in Kosovo and
the feasible pathways to final status. Albanians and Serbs in the Balkans
coexisted uneasily as part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1878, the same year
that Serbia became independent from the Empire, the Prizren League, an
assembly of representatives of the Albanian inhabited regions within the
Ottoman Empire, formed with the purpose of gaining autonomy from that
Empire. The League reflected growing Albanian nationalism. The dele-
gates to the League worked to thwart the implementation of the Treaty of
San Stefano, an agreement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire that
assigned Albanian territories to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, but did
not create an independent Albania, By 1881, the League had established
itself as far north as Pristina, and it declared autonomy from the Empire.
The Sultan finally was galvanized to crush the League and did so in April
1881.
Kosovo had a predominantly Albanian population when Yugoslavia
was assembled by the Paris Peace Conference after World War 1.10 Indeed,
the Kosovar Albanians were bitterly disappointed that Albanian national
aspirations were largely ignored by the Western Powers at the end of the
nineteenth century, and again by the Paris conferees at the end of World
War I. The Paris conferees took it for granted that Kosovo was part of Ser-
bia, although Serb occupation of Kosovo dated only from the 1912 First
Balkan War.
Serbs, meanwhile, viewed Kosovo as an historic part of Serbian land,
at least since the ninth century. Today's Kosovo was the heart of "Old Ser-
bia," where the Serbian Orthodox Church, acting through monasteries still
standing in Kosovo, organized Serb and Christian resistance to the spread
of Islam under Ottoman domination. After the defeat of Austrian forces by
Ottoman forces in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, many
Serbs migrated northward, decreasing the Serb population density in to-
day's Kosovo. These Serbs were replaced by newly converted Islamic Al-
l 0. See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: Six MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 109-24
(2001) (discussing agreement on boundaries of the predecessor of Yugoslavia in post-World War I
peace conference); id. at 357-64 (describing emergence of Albania as a separate state, American sup-
port against efforts by Serbia and other great powers to divide it, and the exclusion of Kosovo, despite a
majority Albanian population).
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banians, who were encouraged by the Turks to migrate northward to further
the Islamization of the territory of Kosovo.
During the two Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century, Kosovo
was a battleground between Serb and Ottoman forces, with Serbia penetrat-
ing all the way to the Adriatic at one point.'1 During the Second World
War, Italian occupation of Albania and much of Kosovo reinforced Alba-
nian nationalist aspirations and also Serb detennination to regain lost his-
torical lands. During the Second World War, Tito sought to enlist Kosovar
Albanians in his struggle against German and Italian forces by promising
them independence after the war. But other political considerations over-
whelmed these promises, and Kosovo became a reluctant province of the
Republic of Serbia within the Yugoslav federation under Tito's leadership
after the war.
From the establishment of Yugoslavia until at least 1974, Serb inter-
ests in Yugoslavia sought to adjust the ethnic imbalance between the Alba-
nians and Serbs in Kosovo by encouraging Serb migration into the
province. From the end of the Second World War until Tito's death in
1980, however, the number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo tripled. The
Kosovar Albanians were allowed to open an Albanian-language university,
the University of Pristina, in 1969. In 1974, Tito sought to mitigate Alba-
nian restlessness through greater Albanian autonomy in Kosovo. He made
Kosovo an "autonomous province" of Serbia under the Yugoslav Constitu-
tion of 1974. This status gave it a constitutional position nearly equivalent
to that of the Yugoslav Republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro,
Bosnia, and Macedonia). It had its own assembly, a legal system distinct
from that of Serbia, and was entitled to be represented directly in federal
Yugoslav institutions. Unlike the Republics, however, it was not explicitly
entitled to secede from Yugoslavia (or from Serbia).
Those institutional changes, resulting in the growing Albanization of
educational, political, and legal institutions under the Constitution of 1974
led to growing Albanian pressure for redefining Kosovo as a republic with
the right to self-determination-including secession, which crystallized in
massive student demonstrations in 1981, only a year after Tito's death.
Albanian assertiveness spawned deep frustration throughout Serbia
during the 1980s. This stimulated a growing Serb resistance to autonomy
11. See CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT, THE OTHER BALKAN WARS: A 1913 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
INQUIRY IN RETROSPECT WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION AND REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESENT CONFLICT




for Kosovar Albanians. 12 The Kosovar Albanians also were restless,
organizing.
Beginning in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic exploited Serb frustration. 13
After he gained control of the Serbian Communist Party and state institu-
tions, he disbanded the Kosovo Assembly, abrogated other legal arrange-
ments that protected Kosovo's autonomy, and caused ethnic Albanians of
the professional classes, including most Albanian government officials, to
be expelled from their jobs. He caused control of socially owned and pub-
licly owned enterprises in Kosovo (the Yugoslav mechanism for organizing
economic production) to be removed from Albanian interests and trans-
ferred to Serbs or foreigners friendly to him.
Kosovar Albanians responded by declaring independence in 1990 and
organizing a "parallel system" with their own schools, businesses, and po-
litical institutions. The goal of this parallel system was to achieve practical
independence and statehood through passive resistance.
In 1996, after the Dayton Accords settled the wars over Bosnia's and
Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia, but did not make any mention of
Kosovo, Kosovar Albanian frustrations with the status quo boiled over. A
guerilla resistance, which came to be known in English as the Kosovo Lib-
eration Army ("KLA"), began attacking Serb police and military facilities
in Kosovo in response to continued Serb repression of the Albanian
population.
Serb forces began an escalating campaign of ethnic cleansing, which
at its high point expelled on the order of 800,000 Kosovar Albanians from
their homes into neighboring countries. The ethnic cleansing campaign was
accompanied by acts of mass violence against Kosovar Albanians and their
families by Serb paramilitary, police, and military forces, intending to in-
duce terror in the population.
After a number of diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful in stabilizing
the situation in Kosovo, NATO began a seventy-eight day bombing cam-
paign aimed at ending ethnic cleansing and protecting human rights in
Kosovo. The campaign ended on June 10, 1999, with the withdrawal of
Serb forces and negotiations involving the "Contact Group" (the United
States, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Italy, and France) in which Serbia,
by then linked with Montenegro and known as "The Federal Republic of
12. See ANDREW BARUCH WACHTEL, MAKING A NATION, BREAKING A NATION: LITERATURE
AND CULTURAL POLITICS IN YUGOSLAVIA 198-99 (1998) (describing Dobrica eosid's expulsion from
the Yugoslav Communist Party for protesting Albanian nationalism in Kosovo).
13. See generally Louis SELL, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
(2002).
[Vol 80:3
INTRODUCTION. FINAL STA TUS FOR KOSOVO
Yugoslavia" ("FRY") participated. This negotiated agreement was embod-
ied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which mandated the estab-
lishment of a civil administration in Kosovo under the control of a "Special
Representative" of the Secretary-General of the U.N. The Resolution also
authorized a security presence comprising NATO forces, augmented by a
contingent from Russia.
The Security Council Resolution acknowledged in its preamble the
sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while giving the civil
administration (now known as UNMIK) plenary powers to govern the terri-
tory of Kosovo. The Resolution also mandated the transfer of these powers
to local Kosovar institutions as they were developed under international
tutelage and became capable of exercising them. The Resolution mandated,
without setting a deadline, a determination of "final status" for Kosovo
through a process influenced by the Rambouillet Accords. 14
In the five years since UNMIK took up its responsibilities in Kosovo,
little has happened with respect to determination of final status. UNMIK
has taken a position in its "Standards before Status" doctrine that certain
standards relating to human rights protection, maturation of local political
institutions, and return of Kosovar Serbs who fled after the bombing cam-
paign must be met before final status can be determined. UNMIK has al-
lowed, however, commencement of discussions over certain "technical
issues." These technical discussions were delayed by the assassination of
the Serb Prime Minister in early 2003 and then by political conflict within
the Kosovar Assembly over the structure of the discussions. Initial techni-
cal-discussion meetings were held in mid-October 2003 in Vienna, and
other discussions, billed as "academic," took place in September 2004.
Interest in accelerating movement on final status was intensified by
widespread unrest in Kosovo in March 2004. Thousands of Kosovar Alba-
nians rioted, targeting UNMIK personnel and vehicles, and also focusing
their rage on Serb "enclaves" and religious symbols. International police
proved largely impotent to stop the violence, and NATO forces performed
unevenly at best. 15
14. The Rambouillet Accords were elements of an agreement negotiated in Rambouillet, France
before the NATO bombing campaign among representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Kosovar Albanians in talks brokered by the Contact Group. The Kosovar Albanians signed the accords
but the FRY refused. The Accords explicitly provided for a determination of the will of the Kosovar
people with respect to final status three years after the effective date of the Accords. The Kosovar
Albanians understood this to mean a plebiscite.
15. The author was in Kosovo during the unrest, witnessed some of the violence in Pristina, and
talked to many participants.
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II. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244
Disagreement continues over the proper interpretation of U.N. Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1244. Some legal commentators read it unambigu-
ously as providing for restoration of full sovereignty in Serbia if some other
final status is not agreed to by Serbia or formally mandated by the U.N.
Security Council. Others read it as contemplating only formal retention of
sovereignty by Serbia during the period of U.N. administration and clearly
contemplating some other sovereign arrangement as a part of final status.
Ultimately, however, determining final status for Kosovo is not pri-
marily a legal issue. If a new Security Council resolution is required to
replace or clarify 1244, the positions taken by Security Council members
will not be determined on the basis of law but on the basis of political con-
siderations within those countries. Even if Kosovo demonstrates that it is
"ready" for independence by satisfying all of the UNMIK-articulated stan-
dards and makes compelling legal arguments in favor of its position, Russia
and China are likely, at the behest of Serbia, to resist Kosovar independ-
ence in the U.N. Security Council, because of their own concerns with the
secessionist tendencies of Chechnya, Tibet, and Taiwan.
III. A REPORT CARD ON UNMIK
According to one set of hallmarks for successful political trusteeship,
the intervention in Kosovo deserves a mixed evaluation. In Kosovo, unlike
Bosnia, the political trusteeship was well designed at its incipience. Ulti-
mate UNMIK authority was clear, although debate ensued over UNMIK's
authority to change political and economic institutions and alter property
regimes because of a mistaken application of the doctrine of belligerent
occupation instead of a more flexible political-trusteeship concept.16 At the
outset, UNMIK enjoyed considerable international and internal legitimacy.
International legitimacy flowed from the U.N. Security Council taking the
ultimate decision to set up civil administration in Kosovo and also taking
responsibility for operating the administration. 17 Internal legitimacy was
high at first, but has eroded, as UNMIK has been slow to transfer power to
16. Treating the U.N. administration as a belligerent occupant would have limited its power to
make only those changes absolutely necessary to meet the basic needs of the indigenous population and
to protect the security of intemational forces. See Political Trusteeship, supra note 2, at 412 (explaining
why belligerent occupation is an unsuitable model for political trusteeships, including the one in Kos-
ovo).
17. The need for U.N. approval does not suggest U.N. administration, Indeed the track record of
U.N. administration in Kosovo is not encouraging as to the U.N.'s capacity to run a competent, trans-
parent, noncorrupt political trusteeship.
[Vol 80:3
INTRODUCTION. FINAL STA TUS FOR KOSOVO
elected local institutions and has engaged in apparently arbitrary exercise
of its power on a number of occasions, with little transparency or pretense
of accountability. UNMIK's internal legitimacy has diminished even more
sharply in the face of its sluggishness in moving toward any sort of negotia-
tions over final status. In contrast, local political institutions in Kosovo,
established through relatively early elections, enjoy considerable local
legitimacy.
UNMIK deserves reasonably good marks for developing institutions
of a liberal democracy, although much remains to be done. Four rounds of
free and fair elections have been held, and at least two of the three major
political parties have worked to democratize their internal procedures and
to broaden their base by appealing to moderate voters. UNMIK has not
done a particularly good job, however, of drawing on unique local experi-
ences or defining and implementing strategies for economic development.
Efforts to build a liberal democracy in Kosovo have been undercut by a
lack of political sophistication, a failure to appreciate the link between eco-
nomic progress and political stability, and an indifference to the rich possi-
bilities for harnessing the unique features of local culture and history to
support the mission of the trusteeship. 18
UNMIK's biggest failure is in its reluctance so far to announce and
implement a sound exit strategy, even though this was explicitly envisioned
by the Security Council Resolution's mandate to facilitate detennination of
final status. 19 Any viable exit strategy includes clearly defined triggers for
devolving power to local institutions, thereby mitigating the inevitable
tendency of postwar euphoria to turn into resentment of the trustee. To
date, there have been no concrete assurances of termination, except for
precatory language encouraging devolution of power to local institutions. 20
18. See Political Trusteeship, supro note 2, at 455-67 (discussing criterion and critiquing
UNMIK's efforts to establish institutions of liberal democracy).
19. UNMIK is obligated by article 11 (e) of the Resolution to facilitate a political process designed
to determine Kosovo's future status. The process for determining final status must take into account the
Rambouillet Accords. The Rambouillet Accords provided for a referendum on independence within
three years. Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, chap.
8, art. 1, para. 3, Feb. 23, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999), available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/168/8I/IMG/N9916881.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Rambouillet Accords] ("Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an interna-
tional meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the
basis of the will of the people .... (emphasis added)).
20. S.C. Res. 1410 provides that the political trustee in East Timor should "downsiz[e]" and "fully
devolve all operational responsibilities" to local authorities as soon as feasible "without jeopardizing
stability." S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. SCOR, 4534th mtg. 7, 8, UN. Doc S/RES/1410 (2002). The Af-
ghanistan resolutions contain no provisions on duration of the trusteeship. S.C. Res. 1511 calls upon the
trustee to "'retum governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable."
S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 511 (2003).
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Delays in defining and starting this process have intensified local opposi-
tion to the political trustee. Local political institutions, emphasizing their
legitimacy based on three rounds of local and national elections, chafe un-
der limitations on full exercise of their political power, imposed by an un-
accountable UNMIK.
Internal political dynamics inevitably will lead to local opposition to
control by the trustee, especially as local political institutions mature. A
successful trustee will manage this legitimacy cycle rather than being
forced into an undignified retreat when the local population becomes un-
willing to tolerate its continued supremacy. Indeed, growing resistance to
the continued authority of the trustee may indicate success in establishing
internal legitimacy of local institutions that eventually must assume full
sovereign responsibility for governing. Growing resistance to the trustee
can be a useful tool in constructing the checks and balances inherent in a
liberal democracy. A sound exit strategy must manage this exchange of one
form of internal legitimacy (for the international trustee) for another (for
the new local government). UNMIK has failed to understand or to exploit
this political dynamic.
Exit triggers should encompass more than elimination of threats of
violence and return of displaced members of the Serb, and other, minori-
ties. Of course, power cannot be devolved to local institutions until reason-
able physical security exists for all segments of the trust population. In
Kosovo, international intervention was justified in order to protect human
rights against ethnic cleansing. The interveners hardly could be expected to
endorse or transfer power to a regime that is likely to commit human rights
violations or ethnic cleansing. But political trusteeship is more than pacifi-
cation and peacekeeping.
Exit strategies in Kosovo should have been linked more broadly to
success in establishing liberal democracy, rather than focusing mostly on
interethnic harmony. If political institutions are not viable, handing power
to them and canceling the political trusteeship will result in a failed state.
Moreover, if no reasonable scenario of economic success exists, political
and physical security will be only temporary. Kosovo would be better off
now if UNMIK had started with the following political criteria for ceding
power:
1. The existence of political parties capable of competing with
each other;
2. Demonstrated capacity to hold peaceful and fair elections;
[Vol 80:3
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3. Demonstrated capacity of political institutions, such as an ex-
ecutive, ministries, and an assembly, to make decisions and
carry them out;
4. The existence of a rule of law, including functioning courts,
reasonable access to those courts, reasonable promptness in
making decisions, and the capacity to decide controversies
that might paralyze the government or impair its implementa-
tion of decisions consistent with basic individual rights in pri-
vate arrangements; and
5. Demonstrated capacity of institutions of a civil society, in-
cluding a free press, universities, and voluntary associations
and legal and accounting professions capable of holding po-
litical actors accountable.
It also should have given far greater emphasis to market-oriented eco-
nomic development, identifying benchmarks for economic viability,
including:
1. Concrete progress toward establishing the basic infrastructure
to support private economic activity. This progress should in-
clude: a transportation and telecommunications system; a reli-
able supply of energy; and a civil administration that grants
licenses and permits promptly, equitably, and honestly.
2. The existence of bodies of substantive law that support private
economic arrangements and specify the terms pursuant to
which commercial disputes will be resolved, including com-
mercial contracts, property conveyances, formation of busi-
ness enterprises, pooling of investments, and investor security;
3. The existence of financial intermediaries necessary to channel
investment funds into enterprises and to facilitate payments
among trading partners, including banks, investment funds,
stock markets, and other mechanisms through which entrepre-
neurs and investors can find each other;
4. Successful initial operation of mechanisms for restructuring
inefficient existing enterprises, through privatization of state-
owned enterprises or bankruptcies of insolvent enterprises;
and
5. Development and acceptance by relevant government authori-
ties of a "national business strategy," including the assembly
of reasonably detailed development plans that show how pri-
vate sector development will be financed, government expen-
ditures financed, and balance of payments deficits financed.
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IV. OUTLOOK
The status quo in Kosovo is unstable. The situation on the ground
could be described as a stalemate. De facto, Kosovo is an independent state
in many respects, but de jure prospects for independence are cloudy. Kos-
ovar Albanian political leaders believe that both international law and the
facts on the ground entitle them to de jure statehood and insist that the in-
ternational community should provide an unambiguous timetable for inde-
pendence. At the same time, Serbian political leaders in Serbia proper and
in Kosovo insist that they must have a say in determining any future politi-
cal arrangements for the area, claiming that according to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1244, the territory remains a sovereign part of Serbia.
Serbian leaders in Belgrade appear intent on delaying final status consid-
eration for as long as possible, most likely because the Kosovo issue is so
loaded internally that no Serbian politician can afford to risk endorsing
anything other than the status quo ante. Meanwhile, the remaining Serbian
inhabitants of Kosovo are themselves divided between the group that lives
north of the Ibar river and which could imagine itself as part of Serbia
should any sort of partition occur,2 1 and those south of the river who will
end up a tiny minority in an independent Kosovo. The United Nations ad-
ministration seems intent on avoiding the issue entirely. It has proclaimed a
policy of "standards before status," but has set such a high bar for "stan-
dards" that few believe these standards could ever be reached.
UNMIK cannot continue much longer as the structure for international
political trusteeship of the territory. If political leaders in Kosovo and Ser-
bia as well as the international community continue to adhere to their
past-irreconcilable-positions, agreement on final status will become less
likely as time passes, and outbreaks of violence more likely. Negotiations
between Pristina and Belgrade are the only channels likely to produce a
stable solution, but successful negotiations will almost certainly not take
place in the absence of some action-forcing strategy pursued by the interna-
tional community, most probably one that sets a deadline for negotiated
agreement to be followed by an international withdrawal in the absence of
agreement. In the meantime, preparatory efforts should focus on develop-
ing an economic program, defining alternative constitutional structures-
especially ones for effective protection of minority rights, defining mecha-
nisms for regional security, and solving the Mitrovica problem as a "prac-
tice round" for final status negotiations. Eventual independence of Kosovo
21. Not only would a partition at the lbar River leave most Kosovar Serbs in an Albanian domi-
nated Kosovo, it also would leave all of the historic Serbian monuments in Kosovo.
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is inevitable, but whether it can occur peacefully and whether it will result
in prosperity and security for all the inhabitants of Kosovo is very much in
question.
A. Progress requires realistic re-evaluation of existing Albanian, Serbian
and international positions.
Kosovar Albanian political leaders are making a mistake if they be-
lieve that the international community is simply going to declare that they
will become a sovereign state. Recent threats by some leaders to propose a
referendum on independence in order to force the hand of the international
community may help make it clear that the status quo is untenable, but a
referendum in favor of independence by itself would accomplish little,
leading at best to Kosovo's coming to resemble Northern Cyprus. A Kos-
ovo that becomes independent through unilateral action would be chal-
lenged to build a sustainable economy, to maintain public order, to extend
its writ into areas now under the practical control of parallel institutions
taking their direction from Belgrade, as in north Mitrovica, and, no doubt,
to protect its borders against military encroachments-all without interna-
tional assistance.
The insistence by political leaders in Serbia proper that Kosovo be re-
integrated into Serbia is similarly unrealistic. Although few political lead-
ers in Serbia proper dare to question the fantasy that Kosovo should remain
sovereign territory of Serbia, it is unrealistic to expect that the international
community, having created a de facto independent Kosovar Albanian state,
will return full sovereignty, given that almost 100% of the Kosovar Alba-
nian population would be against such a move. Furthermore, even if the
international community were to take the step of returning the province to
Serbia, Kosovo would simply be ungovernable from Belgrade. Realistic
assessment of the range of possibilities for final status of Kosovo must take
into account the fact that most of Kosovo is already independent. Elected
municipal governments and elected central political authorities increasingly
exercise most of the day-to-day responsibilities for government, albeit sub-
ject to veto by UNMIK.
If the U.N. mandate for the international civil and military interven-
tion were simply to be terminated and the international community decided
to withdraw unilaterally, the practical reality would be an independent
Kosovo (although not necessarily within its current borders). Therefore,
continued devolution of power from UNMIK to the Provisional Institutions
of Self-Government ("PISG") and any conceivable good faith application
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of the standards implementation plan through the remainder of 2004 and in
2005 inevitably will strengthen this de facto independence.
B. No scenario for final status of Kosovo is worthy of serious considera-
tion unless it takes these 'facts on the ground" into account.
Any plan for restoring sovereignty to Serbia must explain what asser-
tion of that sovereignty would mean with respect to local political institu-
tions determined to resist it. Serbian political leaders who make claims for
simple reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia can do so only because they
know that they will never be given the opportunity to exercise sovereignty
in Kosovo. That is, they make these claims purely for internal consumption
in Serbia.
The international community's position is moribund. The international
community, through UNMIK, has adopted a gradualist policy that avoids
as much as possible dealing with the final status of Kosovo. The present
course envisions the PISG continuing to develop its civil governance ca-
pacity and intensifying its work on technical issues related to final status
through the Prime Minister's working groups, involving Kosovar Serbs and
contact with Belgrade. It envisions UNMIK monitoring progress under the
standards implementation plan and determining, sometime in 2005,
whether explicit discussions of final status are appropriate in light of that
progress. This scenario would include further devolution of competencies
from UNMIK to the PISG, possibly involving transfer of competence in the
justice sphere to the PISG, which would allow local political and legal
institutions to demonstrate their capacity to protect the physical security of
Serbs and other minorities.
Under this approach the majority Kosovar Albanian population is en-
couraged to meet standards which they often perceive as being unrealisti-
cally lofty, not merely for Kosovo but for any modern state. And the
Kosovar Serbs are told that the goal is the creation of a multiethnic state
despite little evidence that there are any realistic possibilities for their secu-
rity. Despite being unpalatable to both Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, this
route remains attractive to the international community because it appears
to present the fewest short-term risks and requires the fewest hard deci-
sions. This scenario is likely to be seen as maintenance of the status quo by
the population of Kosovo, especially if privatization is not restarted
promptly and effectively and if statements by UNMIK and major powers
indicate skepticism about Kosovo's ability to move past the standards im-
plementation plan into a significantly different phase of final status nego-
tiations by mid-2005.
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As the violence of March 2004 shows, however, the international
community cannot control what has been going on in either Kosovo or
Serbia proper, where growing public frustration and alienation from the
democratic political process have demonstrably led to a hardening of posi-
tions and fragmentation of practical political authority. Continued slow
movement on the present course is likely to produce economic implosion, a
pulling apart of local political institutions and increasing unrest, phenom-
ena beyond the ability of the existing KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE, and EU
institutions to manage. Gradualism is likely to lead to further outbreaks of
violence, with unpredictable effects on the security of minorities and on
international political opinion. Eventually, the international community will
just give up, increasingly sending less talented people to staff its institu-
tions in Kosovo, diminishing economic support, and retreating further into
defensive bureaucratic obscurity.
It is easy to see from the above analysis not only that each of the posi-
tions described above cannot lead by itself to a solution for Kosovo but,
even worse, that they work at cross purposes and lead to a situation that
makes finding a solution ever more difficult.
V. CONFRONTING REALITY: THE WAY FORWARD
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Kosovo eventually will become
independent. Different as they are, the three positions we have described
above are all predicated on an expectation that final status for Kosovo will
be achieved by an act from above-a kind of "grant" from the international
community. But such an act is unlikely. There is, however, a second route
to determining the final status of Kosovo: direct negotiations between Pris-
tina and Belgrade that result in an agreement on the part of Serbia and
Montenegro to grant independence to Kosovo. If such a bilateral solution
were to be achieved it would have enormous advantages, not only over the
obviously unstable status quo but even over an international decision
should it be forthcoming. By voluntarily ceding all or some of the territory
of Kosovo, Serbia would show that it has understood its inability to exer-
cise sovereignty over a hostile, majority Kosovar Albanian population. By
showing flexibility in negotiating (even, potentially, on issues of territory)
Kosovar Albanian leaders would demonstrate that they are indeed mature
political statesmen determined to do their best for their countrymen. Such a
bilateral agreement would make moot any need for a new U.N. Security
resolution. Finally, such a negotiated solution would be far less likely to
create a destabilizing precedent for other countries in the region and else-
where faced by similar problems.
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It will be immediately argued, however, that current political realities
in Serbia proper and in Kosovo preclude successful negotiations. There is
some validity in this argument. The proper role of the international com-
munity should be to confront this reality and to adopt the right kinds of
action-forcing strategies to get the parties to negotiate. Absent adoption of
an action-forcing strategy, the international community cannot control what
has been going on in either Kosovo or Serbia proper, where growing public
frustration and alienation from the democratic political process are demon-
strably leading to a hardening of positions and fragmentation of practical
political authority.
A. Action-forcing Strategies
Human experience in all kinds of negotiations-international, litiga-
tion-settlement, and labor-management-shows that parties are not likely
to make the hard decisions and significant concessions necessary to negoti-
ate resolution of a difficult issue in the absence of some action-forcing
event-a strike or lockout in the labor-management context, the possibility
of an adverse jury verdict or an expensive trial in the lawsuit-settlement
context, the fear of military hostilities or withdrawal of economic aid in the
international context. Presently, in Kosovo there is no such action-forcing
event. Things will continue pretty much as they are in the absence of a
negotiated agreement, and neither side finds continuation of the status quo
acutely intolerable.
Accordingly, an effective strategy to induce serious negotiations be-
tween Pristina and Belgrade almost certainly will require more than orders
from UNMIK, "decisions" by the U.N. Security Council, or recommenda-
tions by think tanks or NGOs.
Those interested in resolving the final status issue for Kosovo must be
more energetic in exploring the variety of "carrots" and "sticks" that could
be action-forcing. Under one scenario, a failure to achieve a negotiated
solution within the time allotted would trigger a reconfiguration of the in-
ternational presence in Kosovo. If both sides were perceived as contribut-
ing more or less equally to the failure of negotiations, the international
community would simply pull out, leaving a small force just south of the
lbar river to prevent Serbian incursions into almost 100% Albanian terri-
tory and to protect the most historically and culturally valuable Serbian
monasteries. Failure under this scenario likely would be accompanied by a
formal declaration of independence and statehood by the Assembly of
Kosovo, possibly accompanied by a referendum, hoping for recognition by
a critical mass of states of Kosovo's status as a sovereign state. It would
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then be up to individual world governments to recognize or not the rump
Kosovo as an independent state. If sufficient numbers of them did so, Kos-
ovo would have achieved de jure independence under international law.
Thus, the results of a pullout under these circumstances would be the parti-
tion of Kosovo along ethnic lines and a bleak future for Serbs (approxi-
mately some 75,000 of them) who live south of the Ibar river. It would also
put off for a very long time any consideration of EU membership for both
Serbia and the newly independent Kosovo.
It is easy to imagine that neither side would be happy with such an ar-
rangement. The guaranteed poor result of such a scenario should lead the
Serbs and Kosovar Albanians instead to negotiate seriously to find a better
solution. One presumably tempting "carrot" for successful negotiations
would be a simultaneous admission of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo
into the EU as independent members. It is also easy to imagine, however,
that for a variety of reasons one side or the other would negotiate and then
not act in good faith. If this were to be the case, the international commu-
nity must also have articulated differentiated "sticks" to punish the bad
faith actor as well as "carrots" to reward the good faith actor. If the former
turns out to be the Serbian leadership, it is not hard to conceive of a proper
incentive package. The international community would recognize Kosovo
in its 1974 borders, and move its forces to control those borders, disman-
tling the parallel structures that have been set up from Belgrade to govern
the entire province. Simultaneously Serbia, and possibly Montenegro,
would again become subject to economic and diplomatic isolation. It is a
bit more difficult to think of the proper incentive package to control bad
faith behavior by the Kosovar Albanian leadership. After all, giving sover-
eignty back to Belgrade, while it might sound threatening in theory and
while it might be welcomed by certain nationalist politicians, would lead to
complete chaos if implemented, precisely the kind of chaos that the original
NATO invasion of 1999 was launched to prevent. Still, such a threat, along
with a promise that some international troop might remain, but now to
help the Serbs create a modem European regime in the province, would
probably be sufficient to get the Kosovar Albanian leadership to the table
and keep them there.
The EU must be challenged to identify credible ways for greater
European integration if the political leaders in Belgrade and Prishtina nego-
tiate in good faith about final status. Right now, it is far from clear how
either Serbia or Kosovo could aspire to membership in thc EU in the fore-
seeable future when so many others are already standing in line. It is also
important for the United States government to have some carrots and sticks
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of its own. The United States government must make clear its willingness
to increase economic aid and to participate fully in any revised security
presence in Kosovo. It also may be useful to remind European partners that
one policy option available to the United States government is unilateral
recognition of an independent state of Kosovo. This possibility is available
to break a log jam in determining final status.
B. The Mediation Process
Negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade are unlikely to succeed
without mediation. Even a well-crafted announcement of a deadline associ-
ated with an appropriate, but static, package of carrots and sticks is unlikely
to be sufficient to prod the parties into a bilateral dialogue that can produce
an agreement.
Competing perceptions of history and current reality, enormous mis-
trust, and lack of experience in participating in tough international negotia-
tions would likely undermine negotiations without skillful mediation.
The international community must find a way to engage Serbian and
Kosovar Albanian representatives through an ongoing mediated process, in
which the parties and the mediator allow all options to be "on the table,"
and the mediator credibly can adjust incentives depending on the possible
failure, as the process evolves, of one or the other party to negotiate in
good faith. If the Kosovar Albanians, for example, refuse to respond with
constructive proposals to apparently legitimate Serb concerns on a particu-
lar issue, the international mediator must be in a position to threaten a sce-
nario in which statehood for Kosovo is less likely. Conversely, if Serb
negotiators are intransigent, the mediator must be in a position to threaten a
scenario in which the Serb minority is left to its own devices in an inde-
pendent Kosovo dominated by ethnic Albanians.
Moreover, the international community, as well as the local stake-
holders, must accept a negotiation in which everything is "on the table." In
order to mediate final status negotiations, the international community must
abandon its preoccupation with the possibility that final status for Kosovo
would have a kind of "domino effect" on other countries in the Balkans,
inviting a variety of claims to redraw borders in an attempt to create mono-
ethnic states. Final status negotiations for Kosovo widely are perceived as
presenting special risks for the future stability of Bosnia and Macedonia.
Resolution of Kosovo's final status can have significant impact on success
in these two other Balkan states, but it may be positive.
In Bosnia, nationalist parties emphasize keeping the country separated
rather than united. The three main entities included in two structures, the
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Bosnia & Croat Federation on one hand and the Serbian Republic on the
other, are stronger then the federal institutions. The two federal entities
have their own armies and police forces as well as some formal and infor-
mal fiscal institutions. Local nationalist authorities inhibit the process of
returning refugees and displaced persons. It is far from clear, however, that
progress in Bosnia would be undermined by a negotiated solution in Kos-
ovo. Indeed, a negotiated final status for Kosovo could set a constructive
precedent for Bosnia: aspirations of major ethnic groups in the same terri-
tory must be realized through good faith negotiations between and among
the stakeholders, with international mediation.
Macedonia provides mixed lessons. Although some political parties in
Macedonia reflect the European model, not being based purely on ethnicity
but mostly on modem political alternatives, these parties remain small and
not influential. Despite the domination of the political sphere by ethnically
based political parties, however, Macedonia has, with the help of an active
international community, managed to maintain peace, stability, sover-
eignty, and territorial integrity. Signed after the violence that took place
during the spring of 2000, the Ohrid Framework Agreement provided sub-
stantive democratic reforms to preserve the independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of the Macedonian State. These reforms respect Mace-
donia's multiethnic character through pluralistic approaches that ensure full
respect for fundamental freedoms, including human and national rights. In
particular, Ohrid has led to reformed state institutions that include all ethnic
groups and decentralized local power structures that are in accordance with
the European principles of subsidiarity. The Ohrid Framework Agreement,
if correctly implemented, will reintegrate all ethnic groups, minorities, and
individuals into one democratic society within Macedonia.
Kosovo's final status will undoubtedly influence Macedonia's future.
If a negotiated solution for Kosovo includes a partition along ethnic lines, it
would strengthen arguments for federalization or full partition of Mace-
donia as well. On the other hand, resolving the status of Kosovo as an in-
tact territory within current borders would also strengthen the unity of
Macedonia, leading to greater political stability there. But in any case, the
Kosovo precedent would have been set that any border changes would have
to be negotiated and agreed to by the parties themselves, rather than im-
posed by the international community in a manner reminiscent of nine-
teenth-century great power politics.
Fear of movement toward creation of a "Greater Albania," which long
has encouraged paralysis in international efforts to address final status,
should be set aside. No credible evidence exists that political leadership in
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Kosovo, Albania, or in the Albanian parties in Macedonia, desires any such
thing.
VI. IN THE MEANTIME
Formulating an action-forcing strategy and gaining sufficient support
for it, and structuring adequately sophisticated mediation, will take some
time. In the meantime, important work can proceed on issues that must be
resolved in any event, including formulating an economic program for
Kosovo; developing deeper legal analysis of constitutional alternatives,
including frameworks for protecting minorities; organizing regional secu-
rity arrangements; and making progress on the Mitrovica problem.
A. Develop an Economic Program
Kosovo presently experiences nearly 60% unemployment and a bal-
ance of payments deficit of similar magnitude. Early international efforts to
reform the economy were stalled for several years because of uncertainty
among U.N. legal advisers as to whether Resolution 1244 authorized re-
form of laws and property ownership. Now, although it is generally agreed
that the U.N. mandate is broad enough to cover economic reform under the
concept of "political trusteeship," no coherent vision exists for building a
self-sustainable economy.
Any viable final status for Kosovo, regardless of its political accept-
ability, depends upon Kosovo having a sustainable economy, one capable
of producing about 30,000 new jobs per year. Given Kosovo's size and
lack of access to ocean commerce, economic success depends upon re-
gional integration. It also depends upon attracting foreign investment,
which in turn requires continuing and accelerating the privatization proc-
ess, which got off to a successful start in 2003, but has since been stalled
for nine months by uncertain UNMIK leadership. Privatization must be
resumed promptly, not only because some enterprises may attract invest-
ment as going concerns, but because privatization is essential to free up
substantial amounts of real property now controlled by nonoperating so-
cially owned enterprises on the privatization list.
Kosovo has been participating constructively in a variety of regional
economic activities through its Prime Minister's Office, but because it
lacks sovereign status, it is not a formal member of the Southeast European
Stability Pact. This often means that Kosovo gets left out of consideration
for strategic planning as for transportation routes and may lack the "clout"
to insist that other countries in the region pay attention to Kosovo's need
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and potential. Serious work is necessary on allowing Kosovo to participate
in its own name in international regimes governing telecommunications, air
transportation, international finance, and regional economic planning, even
without it formally being a "state." The operating procedures of the Stabil-
ity Pact should be revised to permit Kosovo to participate as a full member
without waiting for further action on final status.
Discussions about institutional mechanisms to promote regional eco-
nomic integration should be intensified. Trade and customs policies for
Kosovo and for all the countries in the region should be shaped by the con-
cept of a "Balkans Without Borders."
The U.N. and the EU should give much higher priority to market-
oriented economic development. Economic development still tends to take
a back seat to other priorities for Kosovo, even in the recent Standards Im-
plementation Plan.
Resolution of final status will almost certainly require the establish-
ment of some mechanism to resolve claims arising from the Kosovo con-
flict and the period of U.N. administration. The Yugoslav Succession
Agreement will represent a persuasive model for apportioning governmen-
tal assets and debts, but this agreement does not cover private claims, such
as pensions, and business and residential property, which are especially
important in the case of Kosovo. A broader mechanism to encompass these
claims must fill gaps in the existing Special Chamber and Housing Property
Directorate regimes, and usefully can be modeled on the International
Claims Commission established by the U.N. after the first Iraq war, and on
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.
Privatization of socially owned and publicly owned enterprises in
Kosovo is necessary to attract investment and create jobs. Regardless of the
number of SOEs and POEs that can be viable as going concerns, privatiza-
tion is necessary to remove clouds on the title of real property with access
to infrastructure. The more than year-long interruption of privatization
beginning in October 2003 was a serious blow to economic development
and to public confidence in the ability of existing institutions to produce
economic progress.
Privatization must be restarted immediately, without the delays certain
to result from fundamental reworking of operating or bidding policies. Any
gaps in effective recourse of claimants to remedies for deprivation of prop-




B. Define Legal Structures
Essential preparatory work for final status negotiations should be un-
dertaken, including review of alternative constitutional frameworks, giving
special attention to protection of minorities and to decentralization.
Although the content of any constitution for the final status of Kosovo
will emerge only from negotiations, it would be helpful for opinion leaders
and political and legal experts to begin sketching the outline of such a con-
stitution. In particular, they should evaluate the constitutional framework
under UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 and identify specific features of that
framework that would be -unsuitable for final status.
They also must begin some serious work on identifying concrete op-
tions for decentralization of governmental power, drawing on the experi-
ence so far with distribution of power between central PISG institutions
and municipal governments, and evaluating the suitability of foreign mod-
els such as the German, U.S., and Canadian federal and municipal "home-
rule" systems and the Swiss and Belgian models for distributing political
power in a multilinguistic polity.
Attention must be given to legal structures that would back up formal
legal protection of minority rights with internationally supervised and
backed enforcement mechanisms, such as linkages to the European Court
of Human Rights.
C. Protect Minority Rights
Final status negotiators must understand their options for protecting
the rights of minorities in Kosovo, including Serbs, Roma, Turks, and Bos-
niacs, to equal treatment under the law, to be free of physical threats to
their security, and to equal economic opportunity. Experts must develop
sophisticated alternative proposals for a mix of local and international legal
regimes to assure protection of human rights.
There are four basic ways to protect minority rights in the Kosovo
context:
1. Under a robust rule of law in an independent democracy em-
bracing values common across the European Union;
2. Under a special rights regime;
3. Through proportional representation or co-governance ar-
rangements in political institutions;
4. Through territorial autonomy.
None of these approaches is sufficient by itself. Ultimately, of course,
the best protection for minorities is a pluralistic, democratic political cul-
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ture in which multiethnic tolerance is the norm. While this is surely the
long-term goal for Kosovo, it is insufficient in the context of Kosovo's
transition from its present status to a more independent status because of
uncertainty with respect to the eventual political makeup of an independent
Kosovo and because of mistrust in the political process.
A special rights regime comprises criminal and civil laws that impose
duties on public institutions and private persons not to single out minorities
for adverse treatment. These laws can be local ("municipal") or they can be
international in origin. Whatever the source of minority rights protection,
special rights regimes will not be effective without meaningful enforcement
institutions, backed up by international authority.
Systems for ensuring proportional representation in legislative bodies
or co-governance and executive bodies may be an appropriate part of an
overall program for protected minority rights but such approaches are in-
sufficient by themselves. Minority representatives in an assembly may be
outvoted every time. Co-governance arrangements in executive institutions
often lead to paralysis in decision making, as they did in Bosnia after the
Dayton Accords were implemented or in Former Yugoslavia immediately
preceding disintegration.
Territorial autonomy envisions protecting minorities by allowing them
to concentrate in certain geographic areas and to have substantial political
autonomy over their own affairs. The efficacy of such decentralization
approaches depends on the geographic distribution of population by ethnic-
ity and on the practical workings of institutions designed to maintain the
intended balance among multiple levels of government. Relying mostly or
entirely on territorial autonomy to protect minority rights will lead to fur-
ther relocation based on ethnicity, with its attendant disruption of lives and
spawning of disputes.
Ultimately, any negotiated solution likely will include a combination
of the four approaches: a political commitment by independent sovereign
institutions to equal protection; special rights regimes, backed up by inter-
national enforcement machinery; proportional representation in legislative,
if not executive institutions; and decentralization to allow local governance
according to the political will of local populations with differing ethnic
make ups. Protection of minority rights will be at the center of any discus-
sions or negotiations over final status for Kosovo. Progress will require
abandoning simple positions such as, "make us independent first and then
we will erect the institutions to protect minority rights," "you cannot even
negotiate final status until minority rights are fully protected," and "the
only way to protect minority rights is to partition Kosovo."
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D. Provide for Regional Security
More work needs to be done to define the alternatives for regional se-
curity after KFOR leaves Kosovo. How can an independent Kosovo be
protected from overwhelmingly superior military power possessed by Ser-
bia and Montenegro? How can Macedonia and the Presevo Valley in Serbia
be protected from a renewal of insurgency campaigns buoyed by militant
ethnic Albanian elements within Kosovo? How can the TMK-which most
Kosovar Albanians view as the future Kosovo "army"-be integrated into a
security regime that promotes rather than threatens stability? What role
should NATO continue to play? One possibility is that a newly independent
Kosovo would be demilitarized-denied its own army-in exchange for a
formal NATO undertaking to protect its security.
E. Solve the Mitrovica Problem
Mitrovica is a microcosm for all of Kosovo. Mitrovica's division and
unresolved political status reinforce its social and economic crisis and fuel
ethnic tensions. The uncertainty over Mitrovica's future keeps the town
trapped in a downward spiral and poisons Kosovo's future.
The Mitrovica problem provides an opportunity for confidence build-
ing. An urgent effort by Kosovar Albanian and Serb political leaders, as-
sisted by international mediation, to negotiate a solution for Mitrovica
could be a "practice round" for broader-scale final status negotiation and
mediation.
Local Mitrovica political leaders and the international community
need to show leadership in confronting the double challenge of state build-
ing and economy building. The Kosovar Albanian leadership needs to offer
a credible and realistic proposal to the Serbian community living in Kosovo
and engage in direct negotiations with Belgrade immediately. Kosovo's
leaders need to demonstrate that they understand the fears and concerns of
the Kosovar Serbian community and both sides-Pristina and Belgrade-
need to work hard on reaching compromise agreements addressing the
issues of returns and property rights as well as the future role of Serbia in
Kosovo. Serious efforts need to be made by domestic and international
actors to turn this major setback into an opportunity.
A significant breakthrough in returns, property restitution, and trans-
forming the role of the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo from parallel gov-
ernment to long-term donor in Mitrovica could prepare the ground for real
progress Kosovo-wide. A successful negotiation over the future of Mi-
trovica could adopt the approach suggested in the February 2004 package
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proposal presented by the NGO ESI (European Stability Initiative) to local
leaders, or it could result in monoethnic separation.
The ESI package, http://www.esiweb.org/, comprised three elements:
full resolution of property rights and restoration of freedom of movement in
2004, the development of a joint development and assistance strategy for
the Mitrovica region, and the redrawing of municipal boundaries to create a
majority Serb but multiethnic North Mitrovica and Zvecan municipality.
CONCLUSION
A lot is at stake in Kosovo: fulfillment of the aspirations of two mil-
lion Kosovar Albanians for democracy and self-determination, and fulfill-
ment of the aspirations of seven million Serbs to be accepted fully in
Europe. That should be enough, by itself, to embolden other members of
the international community to fulfill their United Nations mandate to bro-
ker a viable final settlement.
But more is at stake than that. This is a time for the shaping of a new
international order based on peace and security, and a time to prove that
international political missions--especially multilateral ones--can succeed.
Kosovo is a highly visible experiment. Inertia and fear of political risk will
only give too much breathing space to cynicism and nationalist political
forces, not only in Pristina and Belgrade, but in other capitals around the
world. Whether we have charted the way forward correctly in this report is
far less important than realizing that something has to change, and it is
unlikely to change without courageous leadership on all sides, and a com-
mitment to results: a commitment to get final status determined soon in a
way that empowers local democracy, protects human rights, vindicates rule
of law, and promotes economic prosperity for everyone in the Balkans.
I believe that the contributions in this issue of the Law Review can
contribute to a more principled and pragmatic shouldering of responsibility
by the international community.
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